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Summary and Conclusion
8.1 Summary
In the introductory chapter 1 we note that recent events of financial disorder
(international debt crisis, junk bond crisis, stock market crashes, bank failures)
have caused renewed interest in the subject of financial _/rag//zfy. Davis (1992)
defines financial fragility as a state of balance sheets offering heightened
vw//jeraè/7/'/> to default in a wide variety of circumstances. A fragile financial
system is more vulnerable to future outbreaks of financial disorder.
During the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, among others, the U.S., Nor-
way, Sweden, Finland, Japan, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom were
confronted with substantial problems at large banks.
The aim of this thesis is to analyze the recent banking problems from a
theoretical (chapter 2), empirical (chapters 3, 4, 5, and 7) and institutional-
regulatory (chapter 6) point of view. The empirical chapters 3, 4, and 7 focus
on the U.S., while chapter 5 deals with Norway, Sweden, and Finland.
Chapter 2 discusses the various theories of financial fragility and disorder. We
first present theories of financial fragility characterized by a full understanding
of risk, i.e. uncertainty can be reduced to the 'correct and objective' probability
distribution. These theories, being the rational expectations and efficient markets
literature and the literature on rational bubbles and runs, contain a postive view
on periods of financial disorder. Basically, these periods of financial disruption
are not causing serious damage to financial markets and the economy since
agents are fully risk aware. In this context such periods are non-events. The
chapter continues by discussing other theories of financial fragility, comprised
of the literature on unanticipated credit rationing, irrational bubbles and eupho-
ria, and asymmetric information. The common element of these theories is that
they all analyze a financial system characterized by an incomplete understan-
ding of risk, thereby leaving room for uncertainty. However, they differ from
each other in the way they model uncertainty. The irrational bubbles and
euphoria literature is extreme in the sense that uncertainty is completely untrac-
table and invincible. The other theories take positions somewhere in between
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The central argument of chapter 2 is that globalization of financial markets,
financial innovation and financial deregulation can work out in three ways:
* Imperfectly competitive or oligopolistic financial markets are opened to the
forces of national and international competition and are becoming more
operationally efficient, thereby generating welfare gains.
* The innovation process may increase debt ratios and volatility in asset prices
and as a result financial fragility in the sense of vulnerability of the financial
system to future outbreaks of financial disorder. If, however, the risks in-
volved are known and correctly priced by market participants, then these
periods of financial disorder are unlucky, but calculated events. Increased
financial fragility may lead to more frequent periods of financial disorder
without causing serious damage to the functioning of financial markets and
the economy.
* If increased financial innovation and financial fragility go together with a
lack of understanding of the risks involved, then underpricing and lack of
risk awareness by financial agents will aggravate the consequences of a
period of financial disorder: not fully calculated events may trigger shifts in
confidence, affecting markets more than appears warranted by their sig-
nificance and leading to a financial crisis.
Taking into account the remarks made above, the financial fragility debate boils
down to the debate on risk and uncertainty. Based upon their subjective percep-
tion of the applicability of risk, uncertainty, or something in between,
academics, regulators, and practitioners will come to different conclusions with
respect to the functioning of financial markets and the desirability of regulation.
Chapter 3 deals with extreme value theory and market assessments of the m -
yt/ness of banks in the U.S. Since the 1970s the U.S. banking system has ex-
perienced major changes in terms of new financial products, deregulation,
increasing competition, lower margins and changing risk attitudes.
In the literature a consensus exists that distributions of asset returns are fat-
tailed. We use a non-parametric tail index estimator based on extreme value
theory to shed light on the empirical distributions of stock returns for the twenty
largest U.S. bank holding companies between January 1973 and December
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1993. Since the tail index is a good indicator of thickness of the tails, it provi-
des an accurate measure of the degree of riskiness of the underlying bank
stocks. Based on this criterion, we find that the riskiness of seven of the twenty
bank holding companies has increased significantly after the start of deregula-
tion in 1980. Moreover, for fourteen out of twenty bank holding companies we
find large increases in the probabilities that the stock prices of these banks
experience a one-week return of 20% or 30% (both positive and negative).
The 1980s witnessed the greatest crisis in U.S. commercial banking since the
Great Depression. Boyd and Gertler (1994) show that banks with the largest
total assets contributed in a significantly disproportionate way to aggregate loan
losses. The intuition is that, while deregulation and financial innovation led to
increased overa// competition for the banking industry, the existing regulatory
environment tended to subsidize risk taking by /arge banks more than that by
small banks (too-big-to-fail policy). The study by Boyd and Gertler corresponds
with our empirical findings of increased riskiness of several of the twenty
largest U.S. bank holding companies.
In chapter 4, extending the analysis of Wolfson (1990), we present an empirical
analysis of indicators of financial fragility in the U.S. banking sector
(commercial banks and S&Ls). For the commerc/'a/ 6an&mg sector our main
conclusion is that the increased variability in the assets of failed banks as a
percentage of total bank assets can be explained for a substantial part by the
increase of the net bank losses as a percentage of average bank loans. It is this
deterioration in the loan performance of the commercial banking sector (third
world loans, junk bonds, real estate loans) that led to the largest U.S. bank
failures since the banking crisis of 1929-1933. This could suggest that banks'
risk awareness and risk pricing were not taking account of the increased ris-
kiness of U.S. commercial banking. Evidence of this increased riskiness was
presented in chapter 3.
For the S<£Z, sector we can conclude that the main factors accounting for the
'instability' in the S&L sector are the decrease in the S&L interest margin and,
in particular, the decrease of the home mortgages share in total financial S&L
assets. The last variable indicates riskier investment policies of S&Ls. Starting
at the beginning of the 1980s when a lot of S&Ls found themselves locked into
negative interest margins (low fixed rates on the assets side and high floating
rates on the liabilities side because of a restrictive monetary policy), they deci-
ded to take a bet on the deposit insurance system in order to try to save their
heads. This was done by investing in riskier products like options, futures and
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junk bonds. Deregulation enabled S&Ls to do this. Especially in the second half
of the 1980s the effects of the risk taking became visible in the form of S&L
insolvencies and failures.
Chapter 5 contains an empirical analysis of the Scandinavian banking crisis at
the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. In this chapter we present
maximum likelihood estimates for pooled banking data of Norway, Sweden and
Finland during the period 1980-1992. Our empirical analysis shows strong
evidence that mown//«g credff /arras played a significant role in the banking
crises of Norway, Sweden and Finland. At the same time we observe that the
bank failures and insolvencies were not caused by a significant deterioration of
net interest margins. A logical interpretation could be that banks have not been
able to charge adequate risk premia in order to be compensated for the higher
lending risks after deregulation had taken effect. This resulted in built-up capital
reserves being too small in order to be able to bear the credit losses and, conse-
quently, in massive bank failures and insolvencies.
The focus of chapter 6 is upon the international dimension to regulation in two
areas (banking and securities business) which, while they have common con-
siderations, also raise different issues. The focus is upon two issues in inter-
nationally co-operative regulatory strategies: syste/mc sta£i/ify and com/re/i/ive
«ew/ra//7y. Two central themes emerge. Firstly, while in some areas there is a
potential case for international co-ordination to increase the effectiveness of
regulation for systemic stability reasons, issues of competitive neutrality might
be dominant and, at times, in conflict with the requirements of prudential
regulation for systemic stability.
Secondly, specific examples of international co-ordination (the examples
chosen are the 1988 Basle Capital Convergence Arrangements with respect to
banking and the 1993 European Union's Capital Adequacy Directive with
respect to securities business) demonstrate that the approaches adopted may be
inefficient in two respects: they do not achieve their systemic stability or com-
petitive neutrality objectives, and the two objectives may be in conflict with the
resultant compromise, being sub-optimum for both.
Chapter 7 presents an empirical analysis of the interest rate sensitivity of U.S.
bank stock returns. The contribution of this chapter to the literature is twofold.
First, using weekly data for the period 1974-1993 and using the forecast
errors of autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) processes in order
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to model the unexpected interest rate, we provide empirical evidence on the
interest rate sensitivity of the stock returns of the twenty largest U.S. bank
holding companies. As in most previous studies, we do not find statistically
significant interest rate sensitivity during the 1970s and strong evidence of
negative interest rate sensitivity during the 1980s. However, the statistically
significant relation disappears completely during the second half of the 1980s.
This result is qualitatively independent of using the three-month Treasury bill
rate or the rate on ten-year Treasury bonds as input for the ARIMA modelling
of the unexpected interest rate variable. Interestingly, our result indicates that,
contrary to the existing literature which only covers the period until the mid-
1980s, the interest rate sensitivity of bank stock returns varies with the sub-
period considered. The only other paper incorporating recent data is Robinson
(1995). Robinson employed quarterly data in contrast to the weekly data in our
analysis. His results are quite mixed in the sense that the sign of the interest rate
sensitivity appears to depend on the choice of the interest rate variable in his
time series models.
The second contribution of this chapter is to use survey cfota in order to
model the unexpected interest rate variable. This is an alternative approach
compared to the existing literature. In this chapter we use weekly survey data
on the U.S. federal funds rate for the period April 29, 1980 until December 22,
1993. The survey was conducted by Money Market Services (MMS) Inter-
national (part of Standard & Poor's) in Belmont, California. The weekly surveys
generate a market expectation for the federal funds rate for a certain survey
period which is then confronted with the realized value of the federal funds rate
during the same survey period. This enables us to calculate an unexpected
change in the federal funds rate for the relevant survey period which is then
used for estimating the interest rate sensitivity. We find a statistically significant
negative interest rate sensitity for the period April 1980 through May 1985.
Since then, the statistically significant relation between unexpected federal fund
rate changes and bank stock returns has broken down. This result is consistent
with our previous findings where we used the forecast errors of ARIMA proces-
ses related to the three-month Treasury bill rate and the ten-year Treasury bond
rate as a proxy for unanticipated interest rate movements. Also in the latter case
we found a breakdown of the interest rate sensitivities during the second half of
the 1980s.
In our interpretation we believe that the breakdown of interest rate sensitivity
of U.S. bank stock returns should be viewed as a process which developed
gradually and became significantly visible during the second half of the 1980s.
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The increase of interest rates due to the October 1979 event caused many insol-
vencies of savings and loan (S&L) associations. These S&Ls found themselves
locked into negative interest margins (low fixed rates on the assets side and
high floating rates on the liabilities side). The S&L crisis led to an increase of
interest rate risk awareness on the part of bankers and regulators. A gradual
process of an increasing professionalization of interest rate risk management by
banks started. Moreover, hedging of interest rate risk became easier and cheaper
because of the explosive growth of derivatives markets trading interest rate
futures and options. All this led to a situation in which banks started to control
the amount of interest rate risk they were willing to accept and to reduce their
sensitivity to wwexpec/ec/ interest rate movements.
8.2 Conclusion
Apart from the country-specific conditions, the banking crises studied in this
thesis also contain a sfruc/Mra/ component which played an important role in all
banking crises. This component relates to the fact that deregulation and
increased competition structurally change the market environment in which
banks operate. Before deregulation had come into effect, regulation acted as a
protection to banks. The key elements to the underlying banking structure were:
low degrees of competition, the existence of restrictive practices, cartels and
anti-competitive mechanisms, high entry barriers into banking, and limited
growth of bank assets and size of balance sheets. Restrictive regulation almost
invariably creates economic rents which have the effect of enhancing the value
of the banking franchise. It is also the case that non-price competition created a
degree of excess capacity that would not be sustainable in a more competitive
market environment. Overall, therefore, the impact of the regulatory environ-
ment was to create excess capacity, monopolistic profits and economic rents in
the banking industry.
The immediate impact of deregulation is likely to be an initial stock ad-
justment response by banks towards new steady state sustainable balance sheet
positions. Financial institutions have a desired portfolio structure for a given set
of market and regulatory conditions, and if any of these conditions change, the
desired portfolio changes and stock adjustments are made to achieve them.
While the new portfolio equilibrium is being achieved through a finite once-for-
all stock adjustment, the volume of credit is substantially increased. The IMF
(1993a) argues: "The increase in borrowing was broadly based, suggesting that
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the debt accumulation reflected a backlog of unsatisfied demand for credit
unleashed after financial liberalization". During such a transitional period of
adjustment from a credit-constrained to a credit-liberalized market regime
economic agents have to learn the new structural equilibrium relations. As long
as learning is still taking place expectations errors need not satisfy any of the
optimality properties usually assumed in the rational expectations literature
(Pesaran 1987). This implies that in such a transitional phase of learning sys-
tematic estimations errors by bankers can be made resulting in inadequate risk
premia, huge credit losses and substantial bank failures and insolvencies.
The movement from the regulated to the deregulated regime does not neces-
sarily imply that, once the deregulated and new competitive steady-state
equilibrium has been reached, the errors will be repeated. What remains to be
determined in each of the case study countries is whether the precarious position
of banks is transitory in nature (associated with the once-for-all shock of
deregulation and increased competition) and whether, once the impact of stock
adjustment effects has been unwound, banks will learn from past mistakes.
What can safely be concluded from the experience in the countries studied in
this thesis, is that big shocks to banking systems (such as sharp changes in
regulation) can easily produce severe reactions. However, it cannot be conclu-
ded that the aftermath of such shocks indicates the characteristics of the new
deregulated environment itself once the adjustment has been made and the
lessons learned.
Nevertheless, the deregulated banking environment may have made banking
potentially more fragile. The erosion of the economic rents induced by previous
regulation is likely to have made banking a more vulnerable industry than in the
past.
